We use information released during the investigation of the California electricity (2000), we calculate a lower bound for the sellers' price-cost margins using the inverse elasticities of their residual demand curves. The downward bias in our estimates stems from the fact that we don't account for the hierarchical substitutability of the reserve types. The margins averaged at least 20 percent for the two highest quality types of reserves, regulation and spinning, generating millions of dollars in transfers to a handful of sellers. We attribute the deviations from marginal cost pricing to the markets' high concentration and a principal-agent relationship that emerged from their design.
Introduction
Under the motto "Reliability through Markets," the reform of the California wholesale electricity sector was implemented in April of 1998 creating an intrinsically complicated market structure. An unbundled system in the language of Wilson (2002) , the new setup was the result of a market design, where ideological rhetoric played a bigger role than serious analysis. In this paper, we diagnose unilateral market power in the state's reserves market. To our knowledge, this is the first study that tries to shed light on the allocative inefficiencies of reserve markets in restructured electricity industries. One considerable barrier to investigating market power in reserve markets is the lack of publicly available data linking reserve bids with firms. We leverage the information released by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) following the events of 2000 and 2001 that matches bids with market participants. We are able to replicate market outcomes with a great degree of precision for the second and third quarters of 2000.
Our empirical strategy follows Wolak (2000) and identifies the ability of firms to exercise market power. In particular, we estimate the price elasticity of the ex post residual demand faced by each reserve supplier at the market clearing prices. In our setting, the inverse of this ex post residual demand elasticity provides a lower bound of the supplier's ability to price above marginal cost. The potential downward bias stems from our lack of data on the cross-price elasticities across the reserves' hierarchical markets. Given positive cross-price elasticities, the inverse of a product's own-price elasticity is a lower bound on the ability of a market participant to price above marginal cost.
We show that, on average, reserve suppliers were able to price the two highest quality types of reserves, regulation and spinning, at least 20 percent above their marginal costs. We attribute these markups, which generated millions of dollars in transfers to a handful of reserve sellers, to the markets' high concentration, as well as to the principal-agent relationship between the markets' buyers (principal) and their supervisory authority (agent).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We first provide a description of the reserve market's operations, rules and participants. We then illustrate the model of bidding behavior that provides the theoretical background of our empirical analysis. Subsequently, we provide intuition for the direction of the bias that we introduce. Finally, we conclude after presenting our findings.
Overview of Market Operations
During the period we study, Scheduling Coordinators (SCs) represented generators and load serving entities, such as the utility distribution companies (UDCs). SCs aggregated forward commitments between demand and supply for electricity at a wholesale level and submitted these schedules to the state's independent system operator, the California ISO (CAISO).
The energy schedules were arrangements for potential physical delivery of a given amount of megawatt-hours (MWh), on behalf of the generators, say to the UDCs, usually on an hourly basis. The CAISO provided transmission services to the SCs on an open and nondiscriminatory basis. The SCs maintained an account with the CAISO for their assigned share of all the costs related to the CAISO controlled grid operations. Such charges included the grid operation and management charges, charges for the purchase of reserves, as well as charges related to the CAISO imbalance energy market. As long as the SCs met their financial obligations with the CAISO, they were able to arrange transmission services with the CAISO.
The SCs submitted their energy schedules to the CAISO twice: a day-ahead (DA) and an hour-ahead (HA) of the settlement period of the trading day they referred to. Energy schedules had to be balanced, i.e. demand had to equal supply. Each day of the week was a trading day. Each of the 24 hours of the trading day was a settlement period beginning with the interval 12:00 (midnight)-1:00. The SCs submitted their final DA energy schedules at 12:00 the day before the trading day for all of its settlement periods. The HA market was a deviations market and it was the last phase prior to real-time operations; it represented any changes from the DA commitments due to updated forecasts of generation, demand, any inter-SC trades etc.. The CAISO received HA schedules one hour before the beginning of the relevant settlement period of the trading day. In the absence of any changes, the HA energy schedules were simply the DA energy schedules.
The CAISO accommodated real-time deviations from the HA energy schedules using reserves of unloaded power, or ancillary services in the industry jargon, and the so-called supplemental energy offers in its imbalance market. 1 The imbalance market operated for each settlement period of the trading day. The ancillary services were vertically differentiated by their "quality"-the speed at which they can provide their power once called upon; higher quality products could substitute for lower quality products, but not vice versa.
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The highest quality service, regulation, allowed the CAISO to fine-tune generation up and down to meet random minute-to-minute demand and supply fluctuations through automatic control. The regulation offer of a generating unit was less than or equal to its ramp rate, expressed in MWs per minute, times a period that varied between 10 and 30 minutes.
The CAISO announced to the SCs the exact period with a 24-hour advance notice. The remaining ancillary services required the manual intervention of their operator upon a dispatch instruction by the CAISO to convert their megawatts (MW) of capacity reserved into energy (MWh).
1 SCs also represented the supplemental energy resources, i.e. generating units and curtailable loads (e.g., commercial air-conditioning and municipal water pumping systems). 2 For the theoretical literature of vertical product differentiation, where consumers agree on the quality ranking of the products, but differ in their choices due to different marginal utilities of income, see Mussa and Rosen (1978) , Jaskold-Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), as well as Shaked and Sutton (1982) .
Spinning reserves followed regulation in the hierarchy. They were able to respond to a CAISO notice within 10 minutes. The amount of spinning that a SC's on-line unit offered was less than or equal to its ramp rate times 10 minutes. Off-line units and curtailable load provided the next product, non-spinning reserves. Off-line generating units' non-spinning offers were less than or equal to their ramp rates times the difference between 10 minutes and the time they needed to synchronize with the system. The non-spinning offers of curtailable load were less than or equal to the time to interruption times the difference between 10 minutes and the time to interruption. The final product, replacement, was similar to nonspinning, but required a 60-minute "lag" in its response to a CAISO notice.
A long list of minimum operating reliability criteria and performance standards dictated the amount of regulation, operating and replacement reserves that the CAISO needed to maintain for each settlement period of the trading day. In addition to these guidelines, the CAISO also took into account close-to-real-time system conditions (e.g., congestion, fuel mix of generation units etc.), as well as historical patterns of deviations from final energy schedules, to calculate its reserve requirements. For example, the CAISO's operating reserve requirements were calculated as 5 percent of the SCs' demand scheduled to be served by hydroelectricity plus 7 percent of the SCs' demand scheduled to be served from other resources.
The CAISO assigned a fraction of its total reserve requirements to each SC based on the SC's share to the total scheduled demand served by generation within the CAISO control area. In many cases, the SCs partially or completely "self-provided" their reserve obligation to the CAISO with the mix of generation and curtailable load they represented, after accounting for the energy commitments of these resources. The CAISO bought any differences between its total reserve requirements and the sum of SCs' self-provisions in the DA and/or HA markets from the SCs that were selling reserves. The first class of reserve sellers were SCs that had submitted forward energy schedules and had positive net reserve positions, i.e. had already covered their obligation to the CAISO. The second class of reserve sellers were SCs that had not submitted forward energy schedules to the CAISO and had no reserve obligation to begin with. This latter class of SCs represented generating units and interruptible loads only for the purpose of their participation in the reserve markets.
The CAISO had full discretion over the allocation of its reserve purchases in the DA and HA markets; it allocated its total reserve expenses among the SCs with reserve obligations adjusting for any self-provisions based on their metered energy demand. Because the CAISO did not bear the cost of the ancillary services, it had little incentive to attempt to arbitrage any price differences that may have existed between the DA and HA markets. Historically the CAISO made 80 percent of its purchases DA.
Ancillary Service Auctions
By 18:00, two days ahead of the trading day, the CAISO published an hourly forecast of its grid conditions, a forecast of the system demand and an estimate of its requirements From the CAISO's perspective, purchasing DA and HA reserves was equivalent to obtaining the right, but not the obligation, for calling energy up to the amount of reserve bought in the imbalance market. Hence, the CAISO signed a European-style call option, where the underlier was imbalance energy, for each MW of reserve that it procured DA and HA. The resulting reserve market clearing price was the option's price. The clearing of the imbalance energy market determined the option's strike price (Bohn, Klevorick and Stalon [1998] ).
The CAISO software cleared the DA and HA reserve markets using only the (MW, $/MW) pairs of the SCs' reserve bids. For the period we study, the CAISO procured ancillary services using a "rational buyer" algorithm. The objective of the rational buyer algorithm was to minimize the total reserve procurement cost capitalizing on the hierarchical substitutability of the reserves (Liu et. al. [2000] ). Setting aside physical constraints (e.g., generating capacities, ramp rates etc.), the algorithm's minimization problem for each settlement period in the DA and HA markets was:
where p and q (p) are column vectors of reserve prices and capacity offers, respectively. We use P roc j to denote the CAISO procurement for reserve type j ∈ J = {1, 2, 3, 4} , where 1 is regulation up, 2 is spinning, 3 is non-spinning and 4 is replacement. The value of the indicator function 1 (·) is one if its argument is true. The prices in p * ∈ argmin p > q (p) that satisfied the above equality and inequality constraints were paid to all the infra-marginal bids (uniform price auction). 3 Whenever the DA and HA market energy schedules were accommodated without the need for inter-zonal congestion management and re-scheduling, the CAISO procured reserves through a system-wide auction generating system-wide market clearing prices for each product. In the presence of congestion, requirements were established on a zonal basis and the procurement was carried out separately in each zone, resulting in zonal market clearing prices. The CAISO tariff defined two major congestion zones, on the two sides of path 15, 3 Reserve markets may be viewed as special types of multi-dimensional auctions where generators compete by submitting two-part bids consisting of capacity and energy bids as Wilson (2002) mentions: "...The design of reserve markets has had a tortuous history..." and he continues: "...The theory of multi-dimensional auctions is complicated, and judging from occasional disasters, so is practical implementation...". See also the discussion in Chao and Wilson (2002) and Kamat and Oren (2002) . a major transmission interface in the state. The first congestion zone was north of path 15 (NP15) and the second congestion zone was south of path 15 (SP15). Other congestion zones were areas within which congestion was infrequent, small and difficult to predict.
Diagnosing Unilateral Market Power: Theoretical Background
A number of studies estimate market power in wholesale energy markets using data on engineering costs. 4 A similar analysis for ancillary service markets is complicated by the capacity nature of the markets. The true economic costs of bidding in the DA and HA reserves markets may involve a fixed standby cost and/or an opportunity cost of not providing energy for the reserve resource under consideration. Because the opportunity costs of providing ancillary services may differ significantly from the engineering costs, analyzing market power in ancillary service markets does not afford itself well to using engineering data.
Our underlying assumption is that the outside option for a reserve resource is to participate in the energy market. More specifically, spinning and regulation units are required to be on-line and running at their minimum level. This requirement implies a fixed cost (being on-line) and an efficiency penalty. For example, steam units achieve their regulation and spinning ramp rates by having their valves in reserve-throttle, i.e. half-open instead of wide-open, which is detrimental to their efficiency (Perekhodtsev [2004] ). Combustion turbine peaking units that provide non-spinning and replacement reserve, on the other hand, can be off-line. Hence, they do not face any fixed costs, as it is also the case with curtailable loads.
The opportunity cost of generating units providing reserves depends on whether their total (variable plus fixed) costs are below or above the price of the energy market that they may participate. We call variable the component of total cost associated with energy released from the reserve. For units with total costs below (above) the energy price, the opportunity cost is their foregone profit of providing energy (zero). For example, for an energy price of $30/MWh, a spinning unit with total cost of $20/MWh has opportunity cost of $10/MWh.
Off-line non-spinning and replacement units with variable operating costs below (above) the energy price face only an opportunity cost (no costs). For hydro units with storage capacity and restraints on water releases, the opportunity cost of providing reserves also depends on energy and reserve prices in settlement periods other than the one under consideration.
The intuition we just developed is further complicated once we incorporate the hierarchical substitutability of the reserves, as well as the interaction between the DA and HA reserve markets.
We adopt the model of expected profit-maximizing bidding behavior in wholesale electricity markets to diagnose the extent of unilateral market power in the DA reserves markets for the second and third quarters of 2000 (Wolak [2000] ). We provide a proxy for price-cost markups using the inverse elasticities of the SCs' residual demand curves for each type of ancillary service. Our results serve as a lower bound on the ability of any one generator to exercise market power because of the likelihood of positive cross-price elasticities across these substitutes.
We focus on the DA markets because they attracted 80 percent of the forward reserve transactions for the period that we are interested in and we ignore its interactions with the imbalance energy market. 5 The price of reserve j in settlement period t is p jt , with j ∈ J = {1, 2, 3, 4} , as above. A settlement period (hour) is an observation and is fully identified by t = 1, . . . , T, where T is the available sample for our analysis (e.g., a year of available observations would imply T = 365 × 24 = 8760). The set of SCs is N and
Ignoring the reserves' substitutability, the amount of reserve j bid by all other SCs beyond
(see Figure 1) . If the total cost of providing DR ijt (p jt ) for SC i is C ijt (DR ijt (p jt )) , its profit 5 The total payment that a SC receives for 1 MW of reserve that makes available to the CAISO is equal to the capacity payment plus the product of the market clearing prive and the expected energy released from its reserve during the imbalance market operations (the so-called "double dipping"). The SC may give up energy for capacity payments for the same amount of total payments (and vice versa), say, if there is a small possibility for its reserves to be called in the imbalance market. function for reserve of type j in settlement period t is:
As opposed to the usual (e.g., Bertrand or Cournot) oligopoly models used in the empirical IO literature, the residual demand function of the player
is ex-post directly observable. We only need the bids submitted by the remainder of the players and the aggregate market demand, which are both publicly available. The advantage of this strategy is that neither functional form assumptions, nor instrumental variable techniques for the purpose of parameter estimation in the residual demand function, are required. The uncertainty could be due to a stochastic component in SO ijt (p jt ) , or an additive error in Q jt . Although we assume that the SC i knows the distribution of its residual demand shocks, we do not need to be specific about the source of the uncertainty because we do not solve for an equilibrium. Had the SC i been able to observe the uncertainty, it would maximize its profit conditional on its value ignoring its source.
We denote the shock to SC's demand function as ε jτ and we write the residual demand that incorporates this shock as DR ijτ (p jτ , ε jτ ) , τ = 1, . . . 24. We also define θ = vec (B),
in the capacity component of the daily bids submitted by the SC i for the k = 1, . . . , K resources it represents. The dimension of θ is (24 × K × 2) × 1. If we stack the cumulative sum of q ijkτ in ascending order of p ijkτ , the resulting curve S ijτ (p jτ , θ) is non-decreasing in
¢ is g(ε j ) yielding the following expected profit to SC i for its daily bid vector θ:
The best-response bidding strategy for SC i is the vector θ * that maximizes E (π (θ)) subject to linear inequality restrictions of the form H ≥ Rθ ≥ L, that reflect market rules, as well as units' operation constraints such as ramp rates, generating capacity etc., discussed in the previous section. Setting aside the high dimension of θ, the non-linear optimization problem to calculate such strategy involves integration in a 24-dimenisonal space with the integrand being the sum of discontinuous functions and is a rather non-trivial exercise. However, if
we write the profit equation in (2) with the residual demand incorporating the shock for the settlement period under consideration, we get the ex post realized profits for the SC i:
In the language of Wolak (2000) , p * jt (ε jt ) = argmax p jt π ijt (p jt , ε jt ) is the best-response price for the residual demand curve DR ijt (p jt , ε jt ) when the shock is ε jt . The price p * jt (ε jt ) and the quantity DR ijt ¡ p * jt (ε jt ) , ε jt ¢ yield the highest profit that the SC i can attain given the bidding behavior of its competitors and its residual demand shock realization. The SC i may then construct its expected profit maximizing bidding curve by tracing out the ex post profit-maximizing price and quantity pairs for its set of possible residual demand realizations (as illustrated in Figure 2 ). Furthermore, by imposing restrictions on the demand and the bid functions, as well as the way that the shocks ε enter these functions, tracing
) yields a continuous strictly increasing supply function, as in Klemperer and Meyer (1989). 6 Regardless of the residual demand realization, the first-order conditions that produce the best-response prices, once evaluated at the observed market clearing price p e jt , lead to the following equation:
we compute DR ijt ¡ p e jt , ε jt ¢ directly using the actual CAISO procurement and the bids submitted by all other SCs beyond SC i. The market clearing price p e jt is also directly observed. It is then expected-profit-maximizing for the SC i to submit a bid curve such that its intersections with any possible residual demand realizations occur at prices where (5) holds for that particular demand realization and the resulting market clearing price p e jt .
Excluding the reserves' hierarchical substitutability in the best-response pricing calculations biases our price-cost markup estimates downwards. To show the direction of the bias, first, we maintain only reserve type subscripts, we drop ε and we write DR j (p) =
. Profit maximization then implies:
which we call the adjusted inverse elasticity rule. The following also holds:
Although ∂SO l (p) /∂p j ≤ 0 for all l and j with l 6 = j, the reserves' hierarchical substitutabil-
The intuition behind the direction of the bias is as follows. Consider first the effect of an increase in the spinning price (j = 2) on the regulation market (l = 1). The regulation supwholesale electricity markets. For early work using the SFE, see Green and Newberry (1992) , Bolle (1992) , Green (1996 Green ( , 1999 ply decreases, ∂SO 1 (p) /∂p 2 ≤ 0, and the regulation demand increases,
Consider now the effect of an increase in the regulation price (j = 1) on the spinning market (l = 2). Although the spinning supply decreases, ∂SO 2 (p) /∂p 1 ≤ 0, the spinning demand remains unchanged, ∂Q 2 (p) /∂p 1 = 0, because spinning does not qualify as a regulation substitute.
Estimating the cross-price derivatives in (6) would require some model of strategic interaction among the SCs and at least marginal cost estimates. Another option would be to make some functional form assumption with respect to the SCs' residual demand curves and estimate directly the cross derivatives (e.g., Bresnahan [1987] , Greenstein [1996] , or Berry and Pakes [2005] ). This approach would be in a different spirit of the functional-form free one taken here. 7 In light of this, we focus only on the inverse of the own-price elasticity and interpret our results as lower bounds on market power.
A final step required for estimating market power is the need to approximate the slope of the residual demand curve. Because the residual demand curve for a reserve supplier is a step function, locally, the elasticity η ijt is either zero or infinite. A simple approximation for the 
7 It is also true that we do not impose any restrictions implied by the market rules on the bidding behavior of the SCs, which are somehow able to achieve p * jt (ε jt ) (see Wolak [2003a] for an excellent discussion on the issue). The adjusted inverse elasticity rule above may not hold on an hourly basis, but the deviations should not be economically significant. Hence, we focus on the differences in our markup proxies across the second and third quarters of 2000. 8 The error in the forward difference approximation
for step size δ of a function f (x) is O (δ) , for |δ| < 1. The same approximation error emerges from the the backward difference approximation
, is an improved version, yielding an approximation error of O ¡ δ 
where K n is the number of resources represented by the nth SC in N −i . Additionally, Φ (·)
is the standard normal cumulative function and δ is the bandwidth that controls the degree of smoothing. 9 See also Wolak (2003b) for the arc elasticity formula.
4 Empirical Analysis
Data
We restrict our attention to hours of DA system-wide procurements between April and the primary DA energy market between the spring of 1998 and before its collapse, late 2000, but also a SC. As a result, the CALPX DA market clearing quantities represent a fraction of the total load schedules. 10 The information released during the FERC investigation of the California electricity crisis in 2000 and 2001 allows us to replicate the reserve market outcomes very precisely for the settlement periods we consider. 11 The portion of the information referring to the reserve markets data incorporates the Rational Buyer market clearing mechanism, which would be almost impossible to replicate with only the reserve markets data released by the CAISO. We replicate the prices (as posted in the OASIS archive) exactly for all the four types of reserves for 98 percent of the total (3683) settlement periods. We do so by stacking the capacity bids in ascending order of their price component and crossing them with the CAISO procurement.
For the remainder of the settlement periods, which we also include in our sample, the absolute percentage deviation between the posted prices and the ones that we derive is less than 5 percent. 12 Therefore, we are confident that the residual demand curves used in our market power analysis reflect the actual market conditions with a sufficient degree of accuracy.
Preliminaries
Figures 3 and 5 provide time-series plots of the CAISO DA reserve procurements, as well as DA load schedules and their deviations from the DA system-wide forecasts. The underscheduling (schedule less than forecast) averages 13 percent in Q2 and 15 percent in Q3 when evaluated at the mean DA schedule. The mean share of the CALPX to the total DA load 10 Recall from our earlier discussion that the SCs submitted balanced energy schedules to the CAISO. The CALPX was a centralized market and its DA market clearing quantity was its balanced energy schedule for the hour. Being a centralized energy market, the CALPX made publicly available the transactions between its loads and generators in the form of market clearing prices and quantities. The remainder of the SCs that submitted energy schedules were small-scale clearinghouses with no publicly available data for the transactions between their loads and generators. 11 Available at http://ferc.aspensys.com/FercData/Miscellaneous%20cd's/CAISO-881/. See also Barmack (2003) . 12 Assume that p 1 > 0 and p 2 > 0 are the posted market clearing price and the one that we calculate, respectively. We define the absolute percentage deviation as |p 1 − p 2 | /|min (p 1 , p 2 ) | schedules is quite similar in both quarters: between 85 and 90 percent. Our proxy of realtime energy procurements represents on average 5 percent of the CAISO DA load forecasts in both quarters.
We truncate 42 hours of replacement at 3,000MW to show that reserve procurements follow under-scheduling very closely. A regression of the reserve procurements on a fifthorder polynomial of the load deviations and hourly, weekday/weekend, as well as monthly dummies, explained at least 95 percent of their total variation for regulation-up, spinning and non-spinning and 75 percent of the total variation in replacement.
The CAISO views substantial under-scheduling (e.g., incidents in mid-June) as threatening to the reliability of its controlled grid and, as a result, it boosts its reserve requirements.
If the under-scheduling coincides with high load levels, the reserve requirements are almost equal to reserve procurements because the vast proportion of the system's generating capacity is devoted to energy. Reserve and energy procurements exhibit a positive statistically significant correlation in both quarters. With the exception of replacement, the average share of reserve procurement to requirement is between 80 and 90 percent in both quarters. The replacement requirements were covered entirely by self-provision for at least 65 percent of the settlement periods (Q2 and Q3).
With the exception of regulation up, the mean MW procurements (Table 1) are larger in Q3 than in Q2 for all reserves. 13 The same holds for both CALPX and real-time energy procurements, as well as for load schedules and deviations. While Q2 is more volatile than Q3 for the operating reserve and real-time energy procurements, the opposite holds for replacement. The difference in volatility between Q2 and Q3 is statistically indistinguishable from zero for regulation up and CALPX scheduled load. Procurements in excess of 1,200MW
for regulation up and 1,500MW for operating and replacement reserves explain most of their kurtosis and stretch the right tail of their distributions in both quarters.
Figures 4 and 6 provide time-series plots for the DA reserve prices, as well as for the 13 For all mean and standard deviation comparisons that we make throughout this section we performed one-sided t-tests and F-tests at 0.05 significance level, respectively. CALPX DA and the CAISO real-time prices. The reserve (real-time energy) markets were subject to a price cap of $750/MW(h), which was lowered at $500/MW(h) on July 1, and subsequently to $250/MW(h) on August 7. The CALPX DA energy market was subject to a price cap of $2,500/MWh. Similarly to the quantities, the reserve and energy prices exhibit a positive statistically significant correlation in both Q2 and Q3. A plausible explanation behind the negative prices in Tables 2 and 1 is the following. A seller that is bidding a negative price tries to secure an infra-marginal spot in the supply curve free-riding on a high positive bid to clear the market. However, if many sellers employ this strategy and the procurement is lower than expected, such strategy backfires. As a result, the sellers end up paying for the reserves or the energy they provide. For example, on July 11, the replacement market procurement and price were 358.5MW and $0.92/MW during hour 19, but they were 75MW and -$99/MW during hour 20.
In many incidents of substantial under-scheduling, the CAISO procured amounts of reserves well in excess of their average levels creating many of the spikes in Figure 4 14 Interestingly, for a fifth of the sample, the average regula-tion, CALPX and CAISO prices are $170/MW, $117/MWh and $148/MWh. Under these circumstances, the CAISO would be better off buying energy in the CALPX DA market to meet its reserve requirements.
Both the reserve and energy prices were more volatile (larger standard deviations) in Q2 than in Q3. Regulation up (Q2 and Q3) and replacement (Q2) are the only cases in which the reserve prices are more volatile than the energy prices in both quarters. Skewness in excess of zero and kurtosis well in excess of three are typical for prices in wholesale electricity markets (Knittel and Roberts [2005] ) and the California reserve markets are no exception.
The positive skewness is attributable to the convexity of the industry supply curve (see also the discussion below). The magnitude of outliers later in the sample is mitigated by the price caps that were in place. Table 3 (NES1) and Williams (WESC). We will collectively refer to them as "Big 5," henceforth.
Market Structure
Using the bid data that we have available, we calculated each SC's share in total sales for each reserve type in Q2 and Q3 (see Table 4 ). Constellation (CPSC), the city of Glendale We also calculated the mean hourly market share for each SC by reserve types for both quarters ( Table 5 ). The replacement had non-zero procurements during 1,081 out of 1,668
hours in Q2 and during 1,339 out of 2,015 hours in Q3. Hence, we calculated the mean hourly replacement market shares using only hours with non-zero procurements for each quarter.
The allocation of the top 4 mean hourly market shares in Table 5 are very similar to the shares we calculated based on the total sales in Table 4 . Finally, we constructed an average supply and an average proxy marginal cost curve for each type of reserve in Q2 and Q3. The first step to construct our average supply curve for the reserve and quarter under consideration was to horizontally sum the supply curves of all settlement periods within the quarter. We call envelope the resulting supply curve.
The second step was to multiply the quantity component in each step of the envelope supply curve with the inverse of the number of settlement periods in the quarter (Figure 7 ).
We constructed the proxy marginal cost curve for each settlement period as in Patrick and Wolak (2001) . We computed the maximum amount of MW sold by a reserve resource, which could be thought as a lower bound for the resource's capacity. We then computed the minimum price that this maximum amount of MW was sold in the quarter under consideration (obtaining an upper bound on the marginal cost of the resource). The proxy (upper bound) for the marginal cost curve for each settlement period emerged by stacking these minimum-price and maximum-quantity pairs in ascending order of their price component and aggregating. We constructed the envelope and average marginal cost curves using the underlying reasoning of their supply analogs.
The flat portions at $0/MW in Q2 regulation up and spinning average proxy marginal Tables 8 and 9 provide the mean hourly residual demand inverse elasticities and their associated standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity) by SC using the arc elasticity formula, as in Wolak (2003b) , for regulation up and spinning, respectively. Only three firms met our conditions for non-spinning and replacement; we summarize these results in the discussion below. The number of observations T ij includes all hours for which¯η ijt¯> 1, such that:
Diagnosing Unilateral Market Power: Findings
The number of observations T ij bias downwards the number of hours during which the SC i placed a markup on reserve type j if that comes entirely from the cross price derivatives.
This may be especially true for the SCs participating in the regulation market because
. For the replacement market participants, on the other hand, ∂Q 4 (p) /∂p l = 0 for l = 1, 2, . . . , 3.
Our t-tests indicated that 1/ |b η i1 | was larger in Q2 for CDWR and the city of Pasadena (PASA). While the CDWR, Enron (EPMI) and Reliant (NES1) had larger 1/ |b η i2 | in Q2 than in Q3, the opposite holds for the Automated Power Exchange (APX1), the city of Azusa (AZUA) and Duke (DETM). 16 The reader should also keep in mind that the price cap of 16 We used only those SCs for which T ij ≥ 50 in each quarter, so that we can perform statistical inference For every SC, we calculated the product of MW sold times its markup for each settlement period during which¯b η ijt¯> 1 and we took the sum of these products over T ij , which we call transfer to the SC. The Q2 non-spinning and Q2 replacement transfers to the Automated Power Exchange (APX1), which were among the largest, add up to about $2.5m. The total regulation up transfers are $1.6m (Q2) and $1.8m (Q3). The same calculations in spinning lead to $3.3m (Q2) and $5.2 (Q3). In Q2 non-spinning and replacement, the transfers sum to $0.9m and $1.5m, respectively. Our biased transfer estimates for all products add up to $14m. 17 The issue that naturally arises is why the various SCs managed to exercise significant unilateral market power in the reserves market over the six-month period analyzed. Some of the answers lie in the findings of earlier studies that focused exclusively on the state's energy markets. Tight supply and virtually inelastic demand along with the lack of substantial forward contracting on behalf of the state's largest utilities have been identified as the key factors of the skyrocketing energy prices in the summer of 2000. There is no doubt about the detrimental effect of the same factors on the reserve markets, which are closely related to the energy market, as we discussed above. In addition, the reserve markets were highly concentrated. The sum of the four largest market shares is at least 60 percent (replacement, Q3) and in some cases exceeds 90 percent (e.g., non-spinning), as Table 6 illustrates.
Some additional answers lie on the design of the reserves market, which gave rise to a principal agent relationship. The CAISO (agent) bought reserves on behalf of any SC with sufficient degrees of freedom. 17 The transfers for other two firms for (APS1 and AEI1) add up to less than $4,000 and less than $7,000 for non-spinning and replacement, respectively.
(principal) equal to the fraction of its assigned share of the total CAISO requirement that could not self-provide from other SCs that had a surplus of reserves. The CAISO did not make any payments, but instead billed the SC on behalf of which bought reserves within 45 days of its transactions. This lack of financial responsibility of the CAISO for its procurements along with the strict performance criteria that its operations had to conform with gave the SCs on the supply side plenty of room to markup their prices. For example, on June 13th 2000, the CAISO faced one of its tightest system conditions. During hour 11, 1/¯η 1jt¯f or Dynegy (ECH1) was 0.55 which at the market clearing price of $550/MW, and a residual demand of 307MW generated a transfer of $90,000.
Conclusion
We examine for the first time the allocative efficiency of a reserves market in a restructured wholesale electricity industry using data from California. We replicate market outcomes with a high degree of precision using largely neglected information released during the FERC Note: For residual demand realization DR 1 , the firm chooses (q 1 , p 1 ) . For residual demand realization DR 2 , the firm chooses (q 2 , p 2 ) . Analogous intuition gives rise to price and quantity combinations traced out by S * (p), assuming additive shocks to the intercept of the residual demand curve as in Hortaçsu and Puller (2007) . 
